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Law of the Continental Shelf
And Ocean Resources--An Overview
HARROP A. FREEMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the innumerable conferences and seminars now being held on the
continental shelf and seabed one senses a general proposition: the stal-
warts of the great maritime powers fought a winning battle in 1945-60
to parcel out the sea and its resources; the most that now remains is
the task of "tidying-up" such issues as the breadth of the territorial sea,
the outer limit of the continental shelf, the extent of fishing rights, the
nature of islands and archipelagos, and the kind of ocean regime re-
quired. There is an assumption that most of the law is "fixed." My read-
ing suggests a contrary conclusion; the concepts of the law of the sea
should be developed around a theory that answers the political-eco-
logical needs of mankind.
It is generally recognized, jurisprudentially, that the concepts of
"property" and "sovereignty" were originally applications of "grab
law," "occupancy and dominion," "sole and despotic dominion," "cap-
ture and domestication," "possession is nine points of the law," "to the
victor belong the spoils," and so on. But the concepts of both prop-
erty and sovereignty are changing.1 We now recognize a social obligation,
a right in others, a lack of absoluteness in property. I feel, therefore,
*Professor of Law at The Cornell Law School, 1946-70; Member of Center for Study
of Democratic Institutions and Chairman with Ambassador Pardo of Law Seminar,
Malta Conference on Ocean Regime, 1970.
1. See generally International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918); U.S. v. Perchemon, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CO, rIEN-
TARIFS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 1 (8th ed. 1778); W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN &
R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAw 466 et seq. (1969); H. GROTIus, De Jure Belli ac Pads,
Libri Tres (1625) (remember this started as a brief by an attorney for the Dutch East
India Company to justify seizure); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, Lecture VI (1881);
2 JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, Table I; 2 J. LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERN ENT ch. 5
(London, 1884).
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that it is too late in the game for the "powers" of the world to seize the
sea, to parcel it out as Pope Alexander VI did, or as the nations in 1910
parcelled out Africa. Nor would it seem proper for the developed na-
tions to establish a new "colonialism" under the doctrine that control
follows the ability to exploit.
Rights in the seabed, including the so-called continental shelf, should
belong to and serve mankind generally. This is a social-ecological-politi-
cal determination, and "Law" should so conform. Such a determination
would tend to limit the power struggle, give us a way to raise the under-
developed countries closer to equality, and allow the tremendously in-
creased population to use the total globe more nearly as one family.
To that end, I would declare the right to the seabed to be vested in
mankind. Following from this proposition, an international regime folild
license exploration and collect license fees; no exploration would give
permanent rights and the social interest could be the main criterion.
The regime could distribute its income in inverse ratio to the GNP,
territorial wealth, and the standard of living of nations, thus raising the
dispossessed and less developed nations. I see nothing in the established
law to prevent this. This is not to suggest that it will be unnecessary
to distinguish between "security," "fishing," and "mining" demands, but
is rather to establish a broad legal doctrine on which specific rules will
be grounded.
It would appear that the whole drive for claiming the continental
shelf, for defining fishing rights, and for making "exploitability" the
test has been primarily supported by representatives of America's fish,
oil, and mining industries, rather than by any basic theory of human,
world, or even U.S. needs.
II. EARLY THEORIES ON THE REGIME OF THE SEA
A. IN ANTIQUITY
The ancient peoples, including the Greeks and Romans, made the
sea their own by force whenever it served their political or economic
ends and continued to rule it to the extent that the vessels of those
times permitted and so long as no stronger power came to usurp their
positions. The sea was theirs because no one was able to challenge them,
and the resources that might be taken from the sea were claimed as a
consequence of state power. The history of this period contributes noth-
ing of importance as far as the juridicial conception of the areas of the
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sea is concerned. Any assertion of sea "rights" was purely metaphysical.2
This view is confirmed by the writings of ancient Roman jurists on
the rights over the sea. Gaius described the sea as res nullius, asserting
that it belonged to the first occupant. Celsus advocated the free use
of the sea: mare communum usum omnibus hominibus. Justinian, in
his INSTTUTEs, asserted the thesis that the sea and its shores rank among
the things common to all men, that the sea is open to public use and
is nobody's property. (The concept of freedom of the seas, since its
formulation, has always been regarded as applying both to navigation
and trade and to the use and exploitation of the natural resources of
the sea. 3) But as Raestad has pointed out, these concepts were part of
the jus gentium and were laid down as defining obligations of a private
nature. Since Rome at the peak of its power subjected all the peoples
on the Mediterranean shores to its sovereignty, the concept of mare
nostrum extended Roman sovereignty over the entire sea as well.4 When
the Goths overcame Rome they promulgated Roman private law, in-
cluding jus gentium as controlling the sea and fisheries. 5
B. IN THE MIDDLE AGES
Feudal law was essentially land law, and except for regarding fish
as ferae naturae, took little account of the sea. The idea of a maritime
area, zone, or belt of sea over which a coastal state might exercise
sovereign power emerged when certain medieval sovereigns and cities
began to lay claims for specific purposes to certain parts of the sea
adjacent to their territories. The first recorded claim was for rights to
fishing and salt extraction made by Byzantium under Emperor Leo
(889-911 A.D.). In a deliberate departure from the principle of free use
of the seas set out in the INSrTUTES, the owner of the shore was to
enjoy sole fishing and salt extraction rights for a certain distance from
the shore. Five centuries later (1482), the King of Denmark and Norway
maintained in a dispute with the English King that foreigners had never
been allowed to fish in Norwegian waters without special permission.
According to Norwegian law, the owner of the national sea frontier
was also owner of the seabed and nearby sea up to the line at which the
great depths begin. Old English law similarly accorded the coastal owner
2. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116; F. GARCIA AMADoR, THE
EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 14-15 (2d ed. 1959);
D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF FISHERIES 159 (1965>.
3. F. GARCIA AMADOR, supra note 2, at 19-21.
4. A. DE BUSTAMENTE, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN HISTORY, LAW AND POLITICS 16
(1924); A. RAESTAD, LA MER TERRITORIALE (1913).
5. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 2.
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exclusive usufruct of the parts of the coast where he customarily fixed
his gear for sedentary fishing. 6 The cases excluded foreigners in favor
of coastal owners. They did not claim sovereignty or ownership for the
state. This qualified and special nature of the claims prevents them from
being regarded as defining the "territorial sea" or "continental shelf."
By the thirteenth century nations began to assert the interest of the
body politic in the coastal seas. The Republic of Venice promulgated
public health regulations subjecting all ships coming from the Levant
to a fortnight's isolation. Later, Genoa (1467), Mallorca (1471), and
Marseilles (1476) 7 adopted similar measures to combat contagious dis-
eases. Venice claimed dominion over the Adriatic Sea and at the peak
of her power won recognition of her claims from other sovereigns. Den-
mark declared its right over the Baltic straits of the Sund and the Belt
and, at one point, over the entire Baltic itself. For a time, Denmark
succeeded in levying duties on ships passing through the Belt. Her
claims went so far as to assert dominion over all the sea between the
Norwegian coast and the coasts of Iceland and Greenland. The most
sweeping claim to maritime dominion was that made by Spain and
Portugal in the 1494 Treaty of Tordecillas (based on Pope Alexander
VI's Bull Inter Caetera, issued in 1493), under which the land and the
sea which had been, or might be discovered was partitioned between
the two countries according to whether it lay to the east or to the west
of a straight line drawn one hundred leagues west of the Cape Verde
Islands.8
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORIES OF MARE LIBERUM AND MARE CLAUSUIM
The jurists of the time seem to have accepted the large areas some-
times claimed by the states and thereby laid the theoretical foundations
of the modern international law concept of the "territorial sea." Bartelo
de Saxaferrato (1319-1357) maintained that the coastal state exercised
jurisdiction over the sea and over the islands in it for a distance equal
to two days sailing, or approximately one hundred miles. (Raestad be-
lieves that this distance was accepted by the majority of fifteenth century
jurists.9 ) Angelo de Perusio wanted jurisdiction extended to any part
of the sea not in the immediate neighborhood of another state, and
6. T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA ch. II, §1 (1911); 2 JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES,
Table I, 12-16; I. LATOUR, LA MER TERRITORIAL 129 (1889); A. RAESTAD, supra note
4, at 11-12, 150-51.
7. I. LATOUR, supra note 6.
8. 1 G. GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 130-33 (1932); A. RAESTD,
supra note 4, at 55 et seq.
9. A. RAESTAo, supra note 4.
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Guillermo de Perno advocated a distance of as far as the eye could
reach.
Baldus of Ubaldi (1327-1406) and Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) be-
gan distinguishing use of the sea, property in the sea, and jurisdiction.
Adjacent sea was res communes, belonging to all, its products exploit-
able by anyone, though the area might be under the jurisdiction (as
for health reasons) of the adjoining state. The feudal law of the King's
jus regalia permitted the giving of exclusive fishing rights in adjacent
seas, and finally territorium was applied to land and neighboring sea.10
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the development of the
concept of the "high seas," which was implicit in the principle of free-
dom of the seas enunciated in opposition to the exaggerated claims to
maritime jurisdiction mentioned above. It was formulated by Francisco
Alfonso de Castro, Fernando Vasquez de Menchaca, Francisco de Vit-
oria, and Hugo Grotius. De Vitoria, in his relictio de indis, challenged
the rights of Popes to grant maritime privileges to certain peoples in a
way contrary to the jus communicationis. Vasquez and Castro denied
the legal validity of the claims of Venice and Genoa as well as those
of Spain and Portugal. Both argued that it was contrary to natural law
and elemental principles of international relations to claim the sea and
its waters as the private property of one nation. The use of the sea
should be common to all nations." The concept was well stated by
Queen Elizabeth of England in a reply to protests by the Spanish Am-
bassador against the passage of Drake's vessels through the seas reserved
for Spain under the Papal Bull:
The use of the sea and air is common to all. Neither can title to
the ocean belong to any people or private persons foreasmuch as nei-
ther nature nor public use and custom permitteth any possession
thereof. 12
Hugo Grotius, in MARE LIBERUM (1608) and DE JuRE PRAEDAE (1609)
stated the principle of freedom of the seas, for the sea was res communes
adapted for the use of all, whether considered for the purpose of navi-
gation or for fisheries. This position came in conflict with the claims
of James I of England (and later with those of the Stuarts and the
Interregnum) to fishing rights in "British seas." Grotius' thesis was
attacked by John Selden in MARE CLAUSUM SINE DOMINIO MArIS, in which
the right of the state to assert its sovereignty over seas adjacent to its
territory was placed on the ground of appropriation, dominion, and
10. 3 A. GENTILE, DE JURE BELLI, LIBmi TREs ch. 17 (1598) ; D. JOHNSTON, supra note
2, at 161-62.
11. F. GARcIA A ADOR, supra note 2, at 16.
12. A. HIGGINS & C. COLOMBUS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 16-17 (2d ed.
1951).
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uncontested use.13 Grotius, by 1625 in DE JURE BELLI AC PAciS, LIBRI
TREs had admitted that liberum might not apply to the adjacent sea,
and a successor, Johones Potanus, finally also conceded this.' 4 By the
end of the seventeenth century the concepts of the "high seas" and the
"territorial sea" had emerged as fairly well defined notions whose influ-
ence was to dominate modern international law.
III. LATER THEORIES
Very little happened for the next two hundred to two hundred and
fifty years in the areas of territorial waters and the adjacent belt. In a
series of cases, many decided by the United States Supreme Court, the rule
of "freedom of the seas" became well established and its content defined
as to rights of search, control of piracy, and free passage. a5 The writers
of the eighteenth century were formulating the distinction between
mare liberum and mare clausum. Pufendorf, in DE JuRE NATuRAE ET
GENTIUM (1672), recognized the special rights of the coastal states based
on fishing and defense; Bynkershoek (1702) fixed on three nautical
miles as the distance of cannon shot for delimiting territorial waters;
Vattel (1758) argued for dominion by consent or tolerance as creating
a customary right.16 The Scandinavians asserted rights from one to
three nautical leagues (four to twelve miles) off their coasts; Jefferson
used three miles or a marine league (four miles) as an approximation.
By the nineteenth century this was generally recognized, though for
some nations and some causes (e.g. smuggling) a three league or twelve
13. See W. WELWOOD, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF ALL THE SEA. LAWS (1613); see also T.
FULTON, supra note 6, at 66-85, 366-77.
14. All property, Grotius argued, was based on possession (occupation) . That which
cannot be seized or enclosed - the open sea for example - is incapable of becoming
property and remains common to all mankind. Property rights derived from prescrip-
tion or from custom cannot be acquired in the sea, for no one has power to grant a
privilege to mankind in general; and mankind in general cannot be assumed to have
granted a concession in the sea. The sea can neither be bought nor sold, nor otherwise
legally acquired, for it is under God's dominion alone. Agreements among maritime
states to apportion certain areas of the sea in order to facilitate the suppression of
pirates are binding only on those who are parties to them and give no right of owner-
ship over the seas. Such tributes as the sovereign may levy under the jus regalia are
imposed not on the sea or on fisheries but on the subjects of the sovereign, i.e. nationals
and not on foreigners over whom the sovereign has no authority. See H. GROTIUS.
MARE LIBERUM 27-36 (1609); DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS, LIBRI TRES 37 (1625) ; Potanus,
quoted in T. FULTON, supra note 6, at 376.
15. J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §309 et seq. (1906). See also note -1
supra.
16. C. BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMENIO MARS DISSERTATiO ch. 3 (1702); 4 S. PUFrNDORF,
Dr JURE NATURAR ET GENTIUMI ch. 5, §7 (1672). See also I E. VATrTEL, LE DROIT ns GENs
ch. 23 (1758) ; Kent, Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 Ast. J. INT'L L.
537 (1954); Walker, The Common-Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 210 (1945).
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mile limit was asserted.' 7 It is to be observed that some local laws and
cases tried to clarify the issue of territorial waters and extended fishing
rights, that a Convention of 1930 attempted some codification, and a
few writers recognized the need for clarifying freedom of the seas as
compared to territorial waters and fishing rights. But generally, prior to
World War II there were no clear government positions on territorial
waters, no attention to the "continental shelf," no authoritative interna-
tional cases, no uniformity as to fishing claims, and no realization of the
importance of a law of the sea to cover all these issues.' 8
A. PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S Two PROCLAMATIONS (1945)
The catalyst for exclusive claims to the resources of the continental
shelf and for opening the fisheries question was the issuance of President
Truman's Proclamations of September 28, 1945.'9 They stated that the
United States regarded the natural (including fishery) resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but
contiguous to the coast of the United States as subject to its jurisdiction
and control. The character of high seas of the water above the con-
tinental shelf and the right to free and unimpeded navigation were in
no way to be affected. While memoranda of law by William Bishop
tried to connect the Proclamations to plans of President Roosevelt as
far back as 1937, one is impressed with their lack of legal justification.
It behooves us to recall how the Proclamations came to be issued and
what occurred between their issuance and the 1958 Geneva Conventions.
17. P. JESSUP, LAW OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 73 (1927);
D. JOHNSTON, supra note 2, at 173-74.
18. One may see this from American casebooks and textbooks. For example, M.
HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1937), has four local cases, the Hague
Convention of 1930, and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration on "Maritime
Frontier;" W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1953) treats the whole "territorial waters"
as a question of jurisdiction of vessels (24 pp.), but does note the "hovering laws" and
12 mile limit; compare this to the new W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSIrZYN, & R. PUGH,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1969), with about 100 pages on territorial waters (archipelago,
baseline, historic, islands, etc.) continental shelf, fishing rights, jurisdiction etc. I find
no casebook or textbook giving attention to the continental shelf or rights in the deep
seabed prior to 1945. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1940), devotes
100 pages to territorial waters, mentions continguous zones, does not refer to continental
shelf and has a very brief note on oil under territorial waters; J. MOoRE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906), deals almost entirely with the high seas. 1 F. WHARTON,
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (2d ed. 1887) has one section on high seas and territorial
waters and fifteen sections on bays, ports, rivers, etc. Finally, not until 4 M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965) does the State Department treat territorial sea
and contiguous zone (ch. IX), high seas (ch. X), continental shelf (ch. XI), and fish-
eries (ch. XII).
19. Presidential Proclamation 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303
(1945); Presidental Proclamation 2668, Sept. 28 1945, 59 Stat. 885, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304
(1945).
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Wilbert Chapman, who did much of the State Department work, re-
lates20 that the fisheries industry had almost collapsed in 1937 in the
face of Japanese fishing in Bristol Bay (discontinued in 1938) and that
the oil industry learned the extent of pools under the continental shelf
during World War II. These interests, he believes, forced the Proclama-
tions. They were being defeated, however, by the Japanese fishermen
and South American legal claims. So, by a legerdemain the U.S. State
Department put off an OAS vote on this matter, proposing instead an
international conference (which was never held), and finally agreeing
to a U.N. Conference (1958) which it felt it could control.
B. AFTERMATH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS
Truman's Proclamations had legal consequences both domestically and
internationally. Domestically, they settled the controversy between the
federal government and the various coastal state governments which
claimed sovereignty over the areas beyond their coastlines. Federal juris-
diction was conclusively upheld by the United States Supreme Court
decisions of United States v. California,21 United States v. Texas,.22 and
United States v. Louisiana.23 During the Eisenhower Administration,
legislation was passed which quit-claimed to the states the rights of the
federal government to that part of the tidelands situated within the three
mile territorial sea or to where the states could show an historic boun-
dary; the outer continental shelf was retained by the federal govern-
ment.24 In subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the paramount claim
of the federal government to the continental shelf beyond three miles
was recognized with regard to Louisiana, California, and Mississippi. 25
A twelve mile limit was recognized as to Texas, 26 while nine leagues was
the boundary established for Florida.27
Internationally, the American claim was followed by similar claims by
the United Kingdom as affecting offshore claims to certain overseas
possessions. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Austra-
lia, Bulgaria, Israel, the United Arab Republic, and Iraq also followed
the American example in claiming jurisdiction over the resources of the
seabed contiguous to their coasts.2 8 Latin American claims were made
20. Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Law of The Sea Institute
(June 24-27, 1968), THE LAW oF THE SEA 35 et seq. (L. Alexander ed. 1969).
21. U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
22. U.S. v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
23. U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
24. 43 U.S.C. §§1301-15 (1964).
25. U.S. v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1959).
26. U.S. v. Texas, 363 U.S. 1 (1959).
27. U.S. v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1959).
28. Orders in Council extending the boundaries of Trinidad, Tobago, and the
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to reserve maritime areas of two hundred miles from shore for exclusive
control to protect the resources of the sea. There may be some slight
ground in ancient law for their claim, primarily as to fish. Certain
nations asserted an island or archipelago theory in extension of contigu-
ous zone control.29
In 1955 the International Law Commission proposed a law of the sea
code,3 0 and after notice to member states this was debated at Geneva
in 1956. The code stated that the territorial sea was not less than three
nor more than twelve miles wide. South America still insisted on two
hundred miles for fishing, but this was procedurally buried by the
United States at Mexico City and Ciudad Trujillo in 1956. Russia's posi-
tion later shifted because of greatly expanded fishing and security inter-
ests. This shift dominated the 1957 and 1958 Assemblies, and the 1958
and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences where the Soviet Union consistently
voted with the United States. The fight over the width of the terri-
torial sea was the major issue.
C. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND Tm SHELF CONVENTION
Eighty-six nations were represented at the 1958 United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva in 1958. It has often been
said that political issues were involved, yet the participants were inter-
national lawyers. Four conventions were adopted at this conference
covering the continental shelf, territorial sea and contiguous zone, high
seas, and fishing.31 These fairly adequately restated most existing law.
Bahamas, I U.N. LEG Is. SERuEs; Law and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial
Sea 30-31 (1951); Jamaica, Id. at 32; British Honduras, Id. at 66; and Falkland Islands,
Id. at 305. Similar Orders in Council were issued for the Persian Gulf, Id. at 27-30;
Saudi Arabia, Id. at 22; Iran, Id. at 81; Pakistan, Id. at 303; India, Id. at 13-14;
Philippines, Id. at 19; Australia, U.S. Naval War College, International Law Sit. and
Doc 441-444 (1961); Bulgaria, Id. at 445-47; Israel, Id. at 475; United Arab Republic,
54 Am. J. INT'L L. 491 (1960); and Iraq, 14 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DRorr INTERNA-
TIONAL 406 (1958).
29. See B. AUGUSTE, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF THE
LATIN AMERICAN STATES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CHILE, ECUADOR AND PERU 80
(1960); F. GARCIA AMADOR, supra note 2, at 73-79. See also W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN,
& R. PUGH supra note 1, at 550-52; U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/18 (1959) by J. Evensen.
30. [1955] 1 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N 72-73, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/ SER. A/ (1955) (refer-
ence to width of territorial sea).
31. The following is a brief synopsis of the latter three conventions not treated in
this article:
(1) The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (done April
29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [effective Sept. 10,
1964]) establishes the sovereign rights of the state beyond its land area over a belt
of sea adjacent to its coast. The exact width of these belts was not fixed in the Con-
vention. The states' sovereignty extends to the airspace above the territorial sea and
to the bed and subsoil of this area as well. The conference was successful in adopting a
system for determining the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. The
Geneva Conference followed the opinion of the International Court in the Anglo-
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A decision could not be reached, however, on the matters of the breadth
of the territorial sea and control of deep sea fishing even after the second
Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116, in allowing the establishment of
straight baselines in "localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into,
or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast." The Convention provides for the right
of innocent passage for vessels of all states through the territorial waters of a coastal
state. Passage is innocent when it is "not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal state." Some nations, notably the Soviet Union, Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Colombia, contend that prior authorization is necessary from
the coastal state before a warship can have the right of innocent passage. These nations
have made reservations to the convention in this regard. Other nations contend that
only prior notification is necessary while still others maintain that no notification or
authorization is required. See Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 59 CoLum. L. REV. 234 (1959). The Convention itself does not provide expressly
that prior notification or authorization for warships is required, except that "sub-
marines are required to navigate on the surface and show their flag" when passing
through the territorial sea. The convention codified the long established customary
international law rule that enforcement of domestic regulations and laws dealing with
anti-smuggling, sanitary, fiscal, and immigration activities by the coastal state may
extend beyond the state's territorial sea limits into portions of the high seas contiguous
to the territorial sea. This right of limited jurisdiction for the prevention and punish-
ment of specific violations is recognized within the area of the contiguous zone, which
may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline of the territorial sea. This
Convention provision in no way limits the right of hot pursuit onto the high seas
for violations occurring within the coastal state's territorial sea.
(2) The Convention on the High Seas (done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [effective Sept. 30, 1962]) codified the customary
international law of the sea which recognizes that the high seas is the area beyond
the territorial seas or internal waters of a state which may not be subjected to the
sovereignty of any state. The freedoms which all states may exercise on the high seas
are the freedom of navigation, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, anl
flying over the high seas. These freedoms and others which may be recognized by the
general principles of international law may be exercised with reasonable regard for
the interests of other states. The Convention provides merely that a state situated be-
tween the sea and a state having no seacoast need only grant a right of transit and of
equal treatment in its ports by common agreement with the landlocked country, on a
basis of reciprocity and in conformity with existing international conventions. The Con-
vention authorizes the practice of "flags of convenience" by which vessels owned by
the nationals of one state may register and fly the flag of another state, so long as
there is a "genuine link" between the flag state and the ship. This link includes the
effective exercise of jurisdiction and control.
(3) The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas (done April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S.
285 [effective March 20, 1966]) is the first comprehensive piece of international legisla-
tion complete with arbitration procedures on the subject. (See Dean, The Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was Accomplished, 52 At. J. INT'L L. 607
(1958).) Conservation is defined in the convention as "the aggregate of the measures
rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure
a maximum supply of food and other marine products." While the Convention
recognizes a broad general right of all fishing states to fish on the high seas, it
exacts a requirement that they assume a positive duty to adopt for themselves or in
cooperation with other nations, measures which are necessary for conservation. If agree-
ment cannot be reached on proposed conservation measures within a specified time,
the Convention's arbitration procedures may be invoked by any interested party. The
special right of the coastal state in regard to conservation measures or research con-
ducted in the sea adjacent to the coast was recognized, even though the nationals of
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(1960) Conference. The Continental Shelf Convention3 2 formulated new
law. It recognized that the coastal state exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources. The term "continental shelf" refers to the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area
of the territorial sea, to a depth of two hundred meters or to where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the area. Most of the following discussion will center
on this convention.
It can easily be seen that this definition of the outer limit of the con-
tinental shelf was the result of a short-term compromise hammered out
during more than seven years of discussion in the International Law
Commission and the Geneva Conference. With the expansion of tech-
nology and world markets, the delimitation of the continental shelf
under the Geneva Convention definition has become the subject of
serious international concern, as has the width of the territorial sea
and contiguous zone when the 1960 compromise of six and twelve miles
missed passing by one vote. At least eighteen nations are now reported
to possess offshore commercial production of gas and oil, while sixty
are engaged in exploration and development. Eleven percent of the
world's oil and six percent of its gas comes from offshore areas.33 Apart
from oil and gas, sulphur, sand, gravel, oyster shells, tin, diamonds, man-
ganese nodules, and phosphate rock are among the commercially valu-
able minerals present on the sea floor. Exploration and exploitation is
constantly moving farther seaward as new devices and techniques be-
come available.34
Whether the Convention allocates mineral rights in a relatively narrow
area or allocates all submarine areas of the world among coastal states
has given rise to controversy. The records of the Geneva Conference and
the International Law Commission suggest that delegates did not think
in terms of the bed of the deep sea. Professor Oda, in his INTERNAnIONAL
CONTROL OF SEA RESOURcES (1963), suggests that whatever the delegates
that state do not carry on fishing activities in the area. The coastal state may demand
that states fishing off the coast agree to conservation measures in harmony with those
adopted by the coastal state. If agreement is not reached, the arbitration procedures
may be invoked. - J. Meurling, ed.
32. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958 [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964). See also F. GARciA
AMADOR, supra note 2, at 108-21.
33. See Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep Sea Floor, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 641
(1968).
34. Undersea Technology Washington Letter, Sept. 4, 1967, 1. A wealth of materials
has been published on the science and technology of exploiting the deep sea including
S. HULL, THE BOUNTIFUL SEA (1964); J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESoURCES OF THE SEA
(1965); F. SHEPARD, SuBmARINE GEOLOGY (1963); U.S. DEP'T OF COmmEcER, DEVELOP-
MIENT POTENTIAL OF U.S. CONTINENTAL SHELVES (1966).
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at the Conference had in mind, the only logical interpretation of the pro-
vision is that it allocated all submarine areas of the world among the
coastal states.35
D. ANALYSIS OF POSITIONS OF STATES VOTING ON THE DRAFT OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF CONVENTION
Article 1 of the Convention, which embodies the definition of the
limit of the continental shelf, was approved by the Fourth Committee
35. The views of Professor Shigcru Oda of Tohuku University, Japan, on the law
of the deep sea resources are highly controversial. Oda challenges the supposition that
there even exists an area of the deep seabed upon which an international regime can
be built. The Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, Oda maintains, already determines
the total disposition of ocean floor resources and has divided the submarine areas of
the entire ocean among the coastal states at the deepest trenches. Oda claims that it
first would be necessary to revise the 1958 Convention before any international re-
gime could be established. (Oda, Proposals for Revising the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf, 7 COLUNI. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1968).) He questions the competency
of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Be-
yond the Limits of National Jurisdiction to initiate such a revision. (U.N. Doc. A/AC.
138/SC. I/SR. 10 at 112-13 (1969).) At the same time, Oda has complained that tle
drafts of non-governmental bodies on possible future regimes for the ocean floor are
"too utopian," and only raise additional problems. (Lecture by S. Oda, The Hague
Academy of International Law, Summer, 1969.) Oda takes no position regarding feasi-
ble future regimes, in case the Convention were to be revised. Nevertheless, he has
stated that the principle of freedom of the high seas is applicable to the exploration and
exploitation of mineral resources of the ocean floor. (U.N. Doc. 138/SC, 1/SR. 14 a!
24 (1969).) In several of his writings, he has also proposed that all crustacea and
sedentary fish be eliminated from the category of seabed resources and be considered
as freely exploitable marine resources. (E.g., S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA
RESOURCS 181 (1963).) The Japanese delegation to the U.N., headed by Oda, holds
the view that the exploitation of the deep sea resources should proceed as rapidly as
possible. (U.N. Doc. A/AC. 13 S.1.Add. 3 (1968).) Oda has emphasized the high
economic risks and technological demands involved and appears to believe that a
registry arrangement with its profit incentive would be most acceptable to the de-
veloped states. (U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. I/SR. 20 at 117-20 (1969).)
His position suits the Japanese and many other technologically developed and
coastal states very well. National oil industries would like to see the jurisdiction of the
continental shelf extend as far as possible because they prefer to deal with individual
states as they have done in the past rather than with an international regime.
Opposed to Oda's views are those who believe that the ocean floor is, or should be,
considered a res communes, the title or benefits of which are to be shared by all. This
notion is opposed to the concept of individual national dominion and also to that of
res nullius, allowing for free use by anyone as in the regime of the high seas. (U. N.
Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 1/SR. 6 (1969) .) Although Oda's interpretations of present inter-
national law lead him to favor national dominion or res nullius, he admits that the
legal regime could be changed as lex ferenda. Nations must first revise the Continental
Shelf Convention which by now, Oda believes, must be considered as international cus-
tomary law. -M. Platzer, ed.
See also Remarks by Professor Scelle, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Dr. Garcia Amador
[1956] 1 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N 135, 137, 167-68. See also Burke, Legal Aspects of Ocean
Exploitation -Status and Outlook, 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MARINE TECHNOLOGY
SoC'y 13-14 (1966).
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of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea by a vote of
fifty-one to nine with ten abstentions.36 However, the vote does not in-
dicate that there was a consensus among the delegates as to what the
provision meant.
Voting for the Draft: The Dominican Republic argued that proximity
was the decisive criterion and that exploitation beyond that was inef-
fective.37 The Norwegian delegate believed delimitation of the con-
tinental shelf in terms of distance from the coast would be fairer. The
United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia agreed.38 Yugoslavia submitted a
draft which would have limited the continental shelf to one hundred
miles from the edge of the territorial sea, fifty miles in cases where the
depth exceeded two hundred meters at a point less than fifty miles. 39
India, while not objecting to the equitable sharing of sea areas, favored
some definite depth limit; one thousand meters was first proposed, then
five hundred and fifty meters.4 0 Canada, regretting both the uncertainty
of the exploitability criterion and its bias in favor of the more advanced
nations, proposed a definite limit based on the point where a substan-
tial break occurs in the sea floor leading to the abyssal ocean depths, or
in its absence, the two hundred meter isobath. 41 Guatemala and Panama
favored including both constituent parts of the continental terrace (the
continental shelf proper and the continental slope).42
At the other extreme, Ghana advocated exploitability as the sole
criterion.4 3 The United States waivered. It thought "exploitability" was
limited to the shelf and slope ("the continental slope fell away steeply
and rapidly, so that exploitation beyond a certain limit would not be an
economic proposition") .44 A group of nine states, (Australia, Chile,
Columbia, Cuba, El Salvador, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, and Peru)
wanted to preserve intact the original International Law Commission
draft. Chile was primarily concerned with ensuring the exclusive right
in submarine coal deposits mined from land at submarine depths greater
than two hundred meters.45 Columbia was anxious to preserve the ex-
ploitability criterion as a device for automatic revision of the shelf limit
in light of technological advance,46 while Cuba emphasized that the
36. VI U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LA'W OF THE SEA- 47 (1958).
37. Id at 9.
38. Id at 4, 5, 27.
39. Id at 32.
40. Id at 42, 134-35.
41. Id at 30, 37, 135.
42. id at 31, 127.
43. Id at 37.
44. Id at 19, 40.
45. ld at 16.
46. Id at 10.
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wording of the International Law Commission draft reflected the widest
possible measure of agreement. 47
Voting Against the Draft: Nine states voted against the draft proposal.
Seven were clearly opposed to the inclusion of the exploitability cri-
terion. Argentina preferred a single geographical criterion.4 8 The Federal
Republic of Germany opposed the whole notion of exclusive rights for
the coastal states and advocated a regime of regulated freedom. 49 Japan
also opposed vesting a monopoly in the coastal states.50 France strongly
opposed the exploitability criterion and feared that in time its adoption
would nullify the principle of freedom of the seas.51 Italy, while ex-
pressing willingness to accept reasonable modifications of the two
hundred meter limit, demanded that the limit must remain a definite
fixed quantity.52 The Netherlands also wanted a definite depth limit
and proposed five hundred and fifty meters.5 3 Pakistan feared a limit-
less extension of the continental shelf on the basis of exploitability and
foresaw disagreements because of the absence of a fixed limit.54 The re-
maining two negative votes were those of Belgium, which gave no reason
for rejecting the draft, and Korea, which opposed it because the depth
and exploitability criteria were inconsistent.55 (Korea had earlier pro-
posed the deletion of the depth criterion.)
Abstentions: Ten states abstained from voting and three (Lebanon,
Panama, and Vietnam) did not take part in the voting. Of these thirteen
states, six were dearly opposed to the exploitability criterion: Greece,
Lebanon, Panama, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam.5 6 A
seventh state, Monaco, considered the continental shelf articles as being
adequate merely as an interim solution pending establishment of an in-
ternational maritime organization. 57 The remaining six states - Burma,
Iceland, Iran, the Philippines, Poland, and Switzerland - abstained for
a variety of reasons and the record shows no evidence that any of them
supported the exploitability criterion. In fact, the positions taken by all
states underlines the flexibility and vagueness of the language used, and
the fact that there is little "agreed law."
Interim Occurrences: Since the 1958-60 period a great deal has changed.
Coastal states, both parties and non-parties to the convention, have
47. Id at 25.
48. Id at 33, 46.
49. Id at 7-8, 37-38, 125, 138.
50. Id at 14.
51. Id at 2, 31-32, 43, 128.
52. Id at 16-17, 133.
53. Id at 6-7, 35, 44, 45-46, 131, 135.
54. Id at 19.
55. Id at 23, 32.
56. Id at 5-6, 32; Id at 14, 34, 38, 129; Id at 5, 32-33, 127; Id at 12; Id at 4, 35-36, 45,
46, 132-133, 135-136; Id at 24.
57. Id at 18.
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adopted municipal legislation extending their respective jurisdictions to
the area covered by the Convention's definition of continental shelf. This
legislation has broad and flexible language easily adaptable to any sub-
sequent developments on the international level concerning the outer
limit of the continental shelf.58
The fisheries issue has greatly changed. The United States has adopted
a twelve mile fishing jurisdiction, and most of the nations have fol-
lowed suit. Russia and Japan lead in long ranging fishing fleets but
many other countries are making serious inroads (Bulgaria, Ceylon,
Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Rumania, Thailand). Canada and the
United States have dropped in fish production and now adopt the
"coastal states" argument. An undeclared "peace" exists between the
United States, Canada, Japan, and the Soviet Union as to fishing, al-
though Japan still protests "abstention." Even boat seizures off Ecuador
and Peru are tolerated and no one wants to submit the issue to the World
Court. The fish-catch of the world has trebled since 1945, yet only Ice-
land seems fish-dependent.
The international climate has immensely changed. The world is not
as polarized; there has been a shift in the balance of power; many new
nations have come into the world community; the Straits of Tiran and
Suez are now "determined" so that new considerations govern the ten
to twelve votes of the Middle East. Whereas you could predict within
three to four the votes of the eighty six nations in 1958, as is shown by
the votes in the Sea-bed Committee, no prediction is now possible.
The peaceful uses of the seabed has now become one of the central
issues. The other two emphases are the fixing of boundaries and estab-
lishing a World Regime.
E. PROPOSALS FOR THE FuTURE REGIME OF THE DEEP SEABED
Although the hypothetical possibilities of future regulation of the re-
sources of the deep sea floor are myriad, it may be of value in concluding
this survey to focus on some of the more recent proposals studied and
recommended by international organizations or internationally minded
groups. In 1965 the Committee on Natural Resources, Conservation, and
Development of the National Citizen's Commission on International Co-
operation proposed a solution which would treat as common property
all the high seas mineral resources for the benefit of all mankind, and
would entrust the allocation of the right of exploitation to a specialized
United Nations agency. 59 In 1966 the Commission to Study the Organiza-
58. See Broun, The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 1968 JURID. REV. 130. Note,
The Soviet Union and the Continental Shelf, 63 Amf. J. INT'L L. 103 (1969).
59. NATIONAL CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, REPORT OF THE
COMMITrEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 4-7 (1965).
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ton of Peace proposed that the deep sea areas be internationalized and
that there be established a special United Nations agency which would
regulate them.60
The Dutch branch of the International Law Association organized
a Deep Sea Mining Committee in 1966 which suggested in its report
that a body of international law affecting the deep seas might be de-
veloped and administered by an international agency."1 Under this sys-
tem, exploration and exploitation fees would be levied for the direct
benefit of the entire community of nations. The World Peace through
Law Center in a 1967 resolution recommended that the United Nations
General Assembly issue a proclamation declaring that the non-fishing
resources of the high seas and the bed of the sea beyond the con-
tinental shelf appertain to the United Nations and are subject to its
jurisdiction and control.62 In 1967 the Representative of Malta proposed
and on December 18, 1967, the United Nations General Assembly passed
a resolution to examine the question of the reservation, exclusively for
peaceful purposes, of the resources of the seabed, ocean floor, and the
subsoil underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national
jurisdiction in the interest of mankind.63 Since then, a permanent Com-
mittee of forty-two has carried on and addressed itself particularly to the
legal principles which should govern the use of the seabed, as well as
the implications of any future machinery to govern its use, and ocean-
ographic research. 64 Senator Claiborne Pell, partly as a result of the Law
of the Sea Institute Proceedings, 65 proposed U.S. legislation to implement
this plan.66
In 1968 the Center for Study of Democratic Institutions held a series
of conferences of engineers, geologists, businessmen, lawyers, and con-
gressmen to discuss the needs for new approaches to the law of the sea.
The result was a draft charter together with a rationale for an ocean
regime. The Center and Ambassador Pardo of Malta proposed to hold a
world representative assembly in Malta, June 1970, to develop and set
up such a regime.
60. NEw DIMENSIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF TIlE NEXT DECAD
36-41 (1966).
61. Netherlands Branch Committee, International Law Association, THE EXPLOR-
ATION AND EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS ON THE OCEAN BED AND ITS SUBSOIL, in TIlE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE 793, 797-98
(1967).
62. See UNITED NATIONS CHARTER COMMITrEE OF THE WORLD plEAcE THROUGH LAW
CENTER REPORT (1967).
63. G. A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16 at 14, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
64. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. 1/4 (1969).
65. See note 19 supra.
66. S2604, 2612, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
